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I. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment should protect not only the right to share ideas and 
factual claims, but also a (limited) right to test them.  
At first, this proposition will seem implausible, even dangerous. The right 
to share and receive ideas is protected, in part, because expression causes no 
direct, physical harm.1 Testing the validity of a claim, by contrast, often involves 
conduct that can directly bring noncommunicative harms.2  
But this proposition is less crazy after recognizing two things. First, the 
performance of the “marketplace of ideas” depends on our ability to validate 
and invalidate competing claims.3 Most claims, whether trivial (statements 
about a consumer good) or profound (statements about health, politics, or 
economic theory) are empirical claims that should be accepted or rejected by 
their audience on evidentiary grounds that the listeners can experience for 
themselves.4 The proverbial marketplace cannot function if listeners are unable 
to access information or run the experiments they need to assess the validity of 
the claims that are offered to them. The state, therefore, exercises great control 
                                                                                                                     
  Professor of Law at the University of Arizona. 
 1 See Leslie Kendrick, The “Speech” in “Freedom of Speech,” 116 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 35), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939794 [https://perma.cc/ 
EA5U-JQZC] (pointing out the limits of this distinction and justifying the specialness of 
speech on other grounds); see also Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information 
Libertarianism, 105 CAL. L. REV. 335, 339, 362–63 (2017) (noting that risks from speech 
“rarely materialize” and that direct behavior regulation differs from regulation of 
information); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 283, 305–07 (2011) (comparing the effectiveness of using words to 
using violence). 
 2 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d ed. 1988) 
(distinguishing governmental free speech regulation of communicative impact versus 
noncommunicative impact).  
 3 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see 
also Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (2005).  
 4 See KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 40 (1959) (“But I shall 
certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by 
experience.”). 
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over human knowledge if it has unfettered power over the means of empirical 
testing, even if it has no ability to suppress the claims that are offered for public 
acceptance. 
Second, the prospect of state suppression of empirical testing is no 
hypothetical. The government frequently exercises state power in ways that not 
only have the effect but the very purpose of suppressing empirical inquiry.5 
Federal and state regulations of research prohibit otherwise legal conduct that is 
done with an intent to learn.6 Proposals for more and greater restrictions on 
research are emerging in the wake of advances in machine learning and AI-
generated research.7 Other laws indirectly but severely limit the ability to test 
hypotheses and generate new knowledge in the course of regulating trade 
secrets, privacy, professional malpractice, computer hacking, and public 
records, again often with the very purpose of obstructing access to knowledge.8 
This Article explains why free speech theory and case law should, can, and 
to some extent already does recognize a First Amendment interest in testing 
competing theories. It then suggests how this constitutional interest can be 
cautiously expanded. This expansion will inure to the benefit of not only the 
participants but the modern regulatory state as well. 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
The First Amendment right to free expression aspires to be scientific.9 The 
Founder Fathers were influenced by the philosophy of science coming out of 
the Enlightenment period,10 and in the modern era, the Supreme Court has 
consistently placed its bets on the theory that truth will emerge from the 
“marketplace” of competing factual claims.11 Even the Court’s analysis under 
                                                                                                                     
 5 See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505 (2016). 
 6 See id.  
 7 See James Grimmelmann, The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media 
Users, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 219, 258–65 (2015) (arguing that social media and corporate 
research should be subject to ethical limits just as academic research); see also Ryan Calo, 
Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought Experiment, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 97, 
101–02 (2013); Jules Polonetsky et al., Beyond the Common Rule: Ethical Structures for 
Data Research in Non-Academic Settings, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 333, 336–37 (2015); Sarah 
Bird et al., Exploring or Exploiting? Social and Ethical Implications of Autonomous 
Experimentation in AI (Oct. 2, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2846909 [https://perma.cc/LC8Q-ZY2R] (arguing for more research on restricting AI-
generated research). 
 8 See infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.  
 9 This was impressed upon me by the excellent work of Joseph Russomanno. Joseph 
Russomanno, Cause and Effect: The Free Speech Transformation as Scientific Revolution, 
20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 213, 251–55 (2015). 
 10 See generally I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE 
IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON (1995). 
 11 “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.” Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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free speech scrutiny, where it consistently demands valid proof that regulated 
expression will cause real world harms,12 promotes the scientific community’s 
secular, evidence-based approach to the discovery of truth and the creation of 
knowledge. 
Fortunately, the scientific approach to the creation of knowledge is 
extraordinarily good, at least compared to its alternatives.13 As Jonathan Rauch 
has explained, it requires adherence to just two simple rules.14 First, no claim, 
no matter how absurd, unconventional, or unpopular, can be removed from 
consideration.15 That is, there is no final say, by the government or any other 
institution, about what is and is not true. I will refer to this as “Claim Liberty” 
for shorthand. 
Second, every person should be able to test the claim for himself to ensure 
that he gets the same results.16 That is, nobody should have to rely on the 
personal authority of the speaker making a claim if they would prefer to verify 
it for themselves. This often (though not always17) requires people to have the 
means to collect information, observe evidence, or experience things for 
themselves. I will refer to this as “Empirical Liberty.” 
First Amendment law gives full and unabashed support to Claim Liberty. 
Even verifiable lies and hateful claims are protected from official suppression 
in order to avoid the problems that arise if the state claims final authority over 
what is and is not true.18 The First Amendment “presupposes that there are no 
orthodoxies—religious, political, economic, or scientific—which are immune 
from debate and dispute.”19 
But the First Amendment does not and cannot give that type of support to 
Empirical Liberty. To see why it does not, consider the claim that the iPhone is 
waterproof.20 Nearly every part of an empirical test, from the purchase of the 
                                                                                                                     
 12 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 576 (2011); see also Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–804 (2011). 
 13 I will concede that the First Amendment is an instantiation of an ideology, as 
Frederick Schauer has pointed out. See Frederick Schauer, The First Amendment as Ideology, 
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 853–54 (1992). Given that information law (and indeed all 
law) must be premised on some ideology, the scientific and Enlightenment principles that 
inspired the country’s founders is a good, defensible option. 
 14 JONATHAN RAUCH, KINDLY INQUISITORS: THE NEW ATTACKS ON FREE THOUGHT 49 
(expanded ed. 2013). 
 15 Id.  
 16 Id. 
 17 Some claims are matters of pure logic or opinion that require nothing more than 
thinking for the listener to test and reject or accept. 
 18 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012); Nat’l Socialist Party of 
Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43–44 (1977) (per curiam); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (per curiam). 
 19 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950), 
aff’d, 341 U.S. 694 (1951). 
 20 Lance Whitney, You Asked: Are iPhones Waterproof?, TIME (Sept. 19, 2017), 
http://time.com/4947730/iphone-8-waterproof/ [https://perma.cc/A5N4-4Z5V]. 
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phone, its transport, and its submersion into water involves noncommunicative 
conduct that can be regulated on the basis of its noncommunicative effects.21 
Even access to Apple’s data on its own waterproofing tests would require an 
eager investigator to violate trade secrets, hacking, or trespass laws that are 
generally immune from free speech scrutiny. 
To see why the First Amendment cannot give full support to Empirical 
Liberty, one needs only a brief tour through the broad range of descriptive 
claims that are theoretically testable but not practically so. Claims that a 
particular food or exercise reduces the risks of heart failure, or that a particular 
tax structure creates more jobs, are empirical claims, but a strong right to test 
the claims with the best possible experiment would enable the tester to impose 
serious interventions on other peoples’ lives. This largely explains why the hard 
sciences like physics and geology can stick closer to the rules of the scientific 
method than the “wet” and “soft” sciences. If humans were studied the same 
way that rocks are, the interests in empirical testing would come into conflict 
with compelling human rights in safety and autonomy and would have to lose 
the competition most of the time.22  
Thus, the First Amendment’s support for the scientific process of truth-
seeking is incomplete. It permits every claim to be submitted to the marketplace 
of ideas, (Claim Liberty), allowing a cacophony of proposed hypotheses, many 
of them wrong, many provably wrong.23 But First Amendment case law and 
theory has done much less to give listeners the means to rationally choose 
between those competing theories.  
This is not entirely surprising because Empirical Liberty is a modern fixture 
in the scientific community. During the time of the Founding Fathers, a 
commitment to Claim Liberty was revolutionary enough by taking control over 
the claims that can and cannot be put forward out of the hands of religious or 
government decision-makers.24 It left the decision about which claims are 
accepted, and why, up to the individual listeners.25 The philosophers of science 
did not fully flesh out and appreciate the importance of empirical methods until 
the early twentieth century, when Karl Popper formalized the requirement that 
a claim must be testable and falsifiable in order to be valid.26 This requirement 
advances human knowledge by assuring all participants that they can see for 
                                                                                                                     
 21 TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-2 (distinguishing governmental free speech regulation of 
communicative impact versus noncommunicative impact).  
 22 Empirical Liberties would even come into conflict with each other, since running one 
experiment would foreclose the possibility of running some other experiment, at least on the 
same people. 
 23 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I 
think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions 
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death . . . .”). 
 24  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A 
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765–1769, at 151–53 (University of Chicago Press 
1979). 
 25 Id.  
 26 POPPER, supra note 4, at 40–42. 
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themselves whether a claim gives an accurate account of the world and, 
therefore, helps kill off the theories that do not match the evidence.27 Popper 
helped elucidate the importance of Empirical Liberty.  
The value of Popper’s contribution was also illustrated in real time by Albert 
Einstein’s theory of special relativity.28 The theory caused an uproar.29 The 
European scientific community was so resistant to relativity that some believed 
the one virtue to the Nazi takeover of Germany was that it caused Einstein to 
permanently settle in America.30 But Einstein was resilient. When the scientific 
community mobilized to publish a collection of essays titled 100 Authors 
Against Einstein,31 he shrugged it off. “If I were wrong, then one would have 
been enough.”32 That is to say, if his theory was wrong, any one person could 
go collect astronomical data that would disprove all or part of the theory.33 
But without Empirical Liberty, people do not have the means to gather data 
and test competing propositions for themselves. A First Amendment that 
promotes Claim Liberty without offering Empirical Liberty may not actually be 
very scientific at all if the laws leave few opportunities for testing. Instead, it 
trades one monolithic, governmental, or religious authority for millions of 
individual king-popes who must resort to unscientific hunches or senseless 
beliefs since they cannot empirically test any of the competing claims. 
I am not the first to observe that the First Amendment is an imperfect vehicle 
for generating factual truth, particularly since its design permits false claims to 
fester.34 The scholars who have tackled the epistemic problems in First 
                                                                                                                     
 27 Id. at 42. 
 28 STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 28–35 (10th anniversary ed. 1998). 
 29 See id. at 193 (discussing how the scientific community attacked Einstein’s theory 
and even set up an “anti-Einstein organization”); Nola Taylor Redd, Albert Einstein: Before 
and After Relativity SPACE.COM (May 2, 2014), https://www.space.com/25729-albert-
einstein-before-after-relativity.html [https://perma.cc/4LBU-99TT] (noting how the 
scientific community withdrew from Einstein’s theory of special relativity).  
 30 HAWKING, supra note 28, at 193. 
 31 HUNDERT AUTOREN GEGEN EINSTEIN [100 AUTHORS AGAINST EINSTEIN] (Hans 
Israel et al. eds., 1931). 
 32 HAWKING, supra note 28, at 193. 
 33 Or, alternatively, just one person could demonstrate an internal inconsistency with 
the theory using words alone. To date, no replicable experiment has falsified Einstein’s 
special theory of relativity. Just last year, astrophysicists were able to confirm the existence 
of gravity waves, adding more corroborating evidence in its support. Calla Cofield, In 
Historic First, Einstein’s Gravitational Waves Detected Directly, SPACE.COM (Feb. 11, 
2016), http://www.space.com/31900-gravitational-waves-discovery-ligo.html  
[https://perma.cc/FQT8-YPCK]. 
 34 See Blasi, supra note 3, at 2; Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 897, 902 (2010) (“Yet although factual truth is important, surprisingly little 
of the free speech tradition is addressed directly to the question of the relationship between 
a regime of freedom of speech and the goal of increasing public knowledge of facts or 
decreasing public belief in false factual propositions.”); id. at 910–11 (“Indeed, the 
persistence of the belief that a good remedy for false speech is more speech, or that truth will 
prevail in the long run, may itself be an example of the resistance of false factual propositions 
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Amendment theory have advanced corrections that abandon Claim Liberty in 
order to avoid the pernicious effects of false claims.35 Robert Post argues that 
outside the scope of public debate, which is at best a free-for-all and at worst a 
cesspool, the state is largely free to regulate the claims of people who hold 
themselves out as experts and to treat listeners as dependents rather than 
participants in the creation of knowledge.36 Fredrick Schauer has encouraged 
solutions that increase the influence of experts by using public funds to support 
and amplify their speech.37 Both proposals encourage public reliance on state-
chosen experts who serve as final authorities on factual truth either by practical 
necessity or by legal mandate.38  
These are serious concessions to the ideal of building a First Amendment in 
the image of the scientific method. But they are also so practical that they seem 
to cause no major loss. After all, the best scientists rely on expert opinions in 
fields outside their own. Even if we had access to very good evidence or had 
unlimited opportunities to run experiments, no single person could test and 
verify every plausible claim (let alone every possible claim) that interests him 
or has a material effect on his life. It will, therefore, always be necessary to rely 
on other people’s expert opinions in order to rule out inaccurate claims, and for 
the foreseeable future, the law will play some role in that process in some 
contexts where health or safety are at stake.39 
However, without sufficient attention on the protection of Empirical 
Liberties, the legal rules that optimize collective knowledge for the short term, 
under assumptions of static or slow-moving access to empirical evidence, will 
not be optimal in the long term.40 Over time, they may require a person to remain 
                                                                                                                     
to argument and counterexample.”); id. (though Schauer also notes that the First Amendment 
is not the sole or even the primary source of society’s lack of concern about factual accuracy). 
See generally SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND 
THE LAW (2014). 
 35 See ROBERT POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 71–73 (2014); Schauer, supra note 34, at 917–18. 
 36 See POST, supra note 35, at 71–73. 
 37 See Schauer, supra note 34, at 917–18.  
 38 Chris Robertson offers a different account of the relationship between Claim Liberty 
and Empirical Liberty in the context of drug labeling and advertising. He argues that the 
claims made by pharmaceutical manufacturers should be constrained in order to induce the 
manufacturers to engage in better empirical testing. Christopher Robertson, Essay, When 
Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation of Drug Promotion Under an Expanding First 
Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 558–65 (2014). This proposition uses restrictions on 
claims as an engine for empirical testing. But it leaves many open questions about whether 
this tradeoff is close to optimal and also whether the more general landscape of the regulation 
of research is consistent with this approach.  
 39 See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1280 (2016); see 
also Jane R. Bambauer, Snake Oil, 92 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 29), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3023388 [https://perma.cc/A4CT-WRLT]. 
 40 The creation of knowledge is not the only place where optimization under static 
conditions can undermine efficiency in the long term. For example, in accident law, rules 
requiring certain safety precautions, like football helmets and antilock brakes, can 
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reliant on the purported expertise of others even if there is no impediment to 
empirical inquiry. If the state directly restricts a person’s ability to test and verify 
competing claims, or if the state indirectly and unnecessarily restricts his ability 
to do so, then any claim that the law must treat listeners as dependents on (state-
selected) experts rings hollow.41 More importantly, it raises legitimate questions 
about what value strong Claim Liberty can have if our Empirical Liberty is 
anemic by design.  
This Article considers whether the First Amendment protects the people’s 
right to test proposed claims for themselves either through experimentation or 
through access to relevant information. On the surface, this will seem like a 
dangerous idea because it risks radically expanding the scope of the First 
Amendment and bringing it into conflict with laws that regulate conduct. But 
on inspection, it is neither radical nor destructive. 
III. PROTECTIONS FOR EMPIRICAL LIBERTIES 
Free speech theory has already embraced Empirical Liberty to some extent. 
The freedom of thought is one of the strongest constitutional commitments 
running through key First Amendment cases,42 and that freedom protects the 
process of subjecting various theories to personal testing. Of course, thought 
experiments are self-contained in the minds of the people who run them, so they 
are readily distinguishable from conduct that attempts to access information or 
run a physical experiment. Nevertheless, the highly prized right to free thought 
should protect inquiry and investigation.43 The thinker’s interests are as 
concerned with Empirical Liberty as Claim Liberty. The free thinker must not 
only hear or consider competing theories but must decide for himself whether 
an offered proposition is consistent with his accumulated knowledge, 
                                                                                                                     
counterintuitively cause accident rates to increase because people engage in riskier behavior 
in reliance on the precautions. Michael Munger, The Dangers of Safety Equipment, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/opinion/the-dangers-of-safety-
equipment.html [https://perma.cc/GTT5-3T52]. This has been called the “Peltzman effect.” 
Id. Similarly, tort liability damage caps can cause technological innovations that reduce the 
most severe injuries to wane, exposing doctors to more liability in the long run. See HBS 
Working Knowledge, How Malpractice Reform Affects Medical Device Innovation, FORBES 
(Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2016/11/28/how-
malpractice-reform-affects-medical-device-innovation/#50d4d3b3464e 
[https://perma.cc/BZG9-SZ8G]. 
 41 Although, even with perfect Empirical Liberty, there will still be good reasons to 
create legal structures that allow people to rely on expert services like medical care knowing 
that the service provider conforms with a minimum level of expertise.  
 42 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1682 (2015) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(“Free speech begins with the right of each person to think and then to express his or her 
own ideas.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  
 43 See generally SHIFFRIN, supra note 34. 
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experience, and personal values.44 Thus, when the Supreme Court asserts that 
our First Amendment rights are breached by state attempts to control minds,45 
Empirical Liberty is already on the table. The only question is how broadly the 
liberty extends. 
The courts have permitted for it to extend beyond the testing that can be 
done with the mind alone.46 Recent case law has protected the right to 
mechanically capture information because courts have recognized that both 
speakers and listeners have an interest not only in exchanging claims, but in 
being able to better verify those claims with evidence that is more credible and 
reliable (with the understanding that perfection is not possible).47  
For example, in American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez, the 
Seventh Circuit found that the state’s wiretap law prohibiting unconsented audio 
recording in public violated the First Amendment.48 Its reasoning was primarily 
an outgrowth of Claim Liberty because the court thought the right to make a 
video was a necessary corollary to the right to disseminate it.49 Thus, recording 
is just one example of speech-facilitating conduct that is protected because of 
the end result—more speech deposited into the marketplace of ideas.50 But that 
is not all that Alvarez does. The court decided that First Amendment scrutiny 
was necessary not only because recording helps communication but because it 
preserves evidence in a way that offers particular credibility to listeners.51 
“[A]udio and audiovisual recording are uniquely reliable and powerful methods 
of preserving and disseminating news and information about events that occur 
in public. Their self-authenticating character makes it highly unlikely that other 
methods could be considered reasonably adequate substitutes.”52 
Not long ago, the First Amendment coverage of digital sound and image 
capture was controversial,53 but courts now take it for granted.54 The First 
Circuit accepted without comment that a law banning photographs of filled-out 
ballots (“ballot selfies”) implicated free speech even though it left voters free to 
                                                                                                                     
 44 Some of this testing will not be empirical in the sense of comparing the claim to 
observations from the world, but much of it will.  
 45 “The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.” Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010). 
 46 See infra notes 47–60 and accompanying text. 
 47 Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586–87 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 595. 
 50 Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2016). 
 51 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 586. 
 52 Id. at 607. 
 53 See Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, 
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 339 (2011).  
 54 For more recent treatments showing the current state of the law, see generally Margot 
E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167 (2017), and Justin 
Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video Age, 116 COLUM. L. 
REV. 991 (2016). 
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communicate how they voted using other forms of speech.55 Speakers who 
come armed with digital sound and image recordings offer not only their factual 
claims, but the relatively objective evidence that listeners can use to verify the 
claims.56 That difference shows the constitutional significance of Empirical 
Liberty, and not just Claim Liberty.  
The Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged a First Amendment interest in 
information-gathering in Branzburg v. Hayes.57 Although the holding of the 
case assured that neutral laws of general applicability could be applied to news 
organizations and other information-gatherers,58 the necessary implication is 
that a First Amendment right to news gathering would spring to action if a law 
targeted information-gathering for the very purpose of disrupting it. In one 
limited context—access to the courts—the Supreme Court has even recognized 
a positive right to access information, requiring court proceedings as a default 
to be open to the public.59 Indeed, the judiciary is structured to offer a lot of raw 
material for empirical inquiry compared to other institutions; it permits parties 
to dislodge all sorts of documents and data through very permissive discovery 
rules.60 
But the Court has not explored the logical implications or necessary 
limitations of Empirical Liberty. If we are committed to a scientific approach 
for First Amendment theory, then we must recognize the essential role of 
Empirical Liberty and protect it more vigorously than we currently do. That 
commitment will cause friction with current law and policy.  
The first clash comes from restrictions on experimentation. Malpractice 
rules and federal statutory law often prohibit research on humans without prior 
consent or permission from an Institutional Review Board no matter what 
conduct is involved.61 These restrictions apply any time the researcher has the 
intent to produce generalizable knowledge, even if the acts in which he engages 
are otherwise perfectly legal.62 If a doctor studies how his patients have fared 
under two different courses of treatment without receiving consent in advance, 
                                                                                                                     
 55 See Rideout v. Gardner, 838 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 56 Marceau & Chen, supra note 54, at 1009–10 (noting that video recording’s ability to 
document interactions can provide individuals with evidence to validate claims and increase 
credibility). 
 57 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972) (“[N]ews gathering is not without its 
First Amendment protections . . . .”). 
 58 Id. at 682–83 (citing Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937)). 
 59 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1982); 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576, 580 (1980). 
 60 The courts also impose a strong presumption against protective orders. Jepson, Inc. 
v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 61 See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505 (2016); see also supra 
note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the rules regarding research on humans). 
 62 Jane R. Bambauer, All Life Is an Experiment. (Sometimes It Is a Controlled 
Experiment.), 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 487, 509 (2015); Grimmelmann, supra note 7, at 261 
(“The Common Rule distinguishes between unregulated practice and regulated ‘research’ by 
defining research in terms of intended contribution to ‘generalizable knowledge.’”). 
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he will have committed malpractice even if both treatments are within the 
standard of care and are consistent with the recommendations he would have 
made anyways.63 And academic researchers must receive prior approval from 
their institutions before studying any identifiable or potentially identifiable 
human subjects, even if their research has no effect on the subjects’ lives.64 
Since these restrictions target research qua research, any level of commitment 
to Empirical Liberty should trigger First Amendment scrutiny of these laws. 
And while reasonable minds may differ on the nature of that scrutiny, the 
breadth of current restrictions on research probably sweeps much wider than the 
countervailing interests in safety, autonomy, and dignity can justify. 
The invalidation of research law is not as dangerous as it may seem at first 
blush. Even if the laws regulating research were revoked, laws of general 
application would frustrate a lot of experimentation, and for good reason. If a 
researcher replaced an unsuspecting person’s medication with a placebo, or stole 
a valued personal item to collect a sample, he would violate the criminal, tort, 
and property laws that protect the person’s fundamental interests in the control 
of his own body, home, and things. State law protecting these rights are 
orthogonal to any state goal to suppress knowledge. So no matter how important 
the research may be, it cannot be used to invalidate these types of laws or their 
application to researchers.  
Perhaps under United States v. O’Brien, the courts would have to ensure 
that the incidental restrictions on experimentation caused by general regulations 
of conduct would be “no greater than is essential” to further the state’s interest,65 
but the Court has never demonstrated what limit (if any) this part of the O’Brien 
test poses. Empirical Liberty may require that laws of general application leave 
open some alternative channels of experimentation and evidence-gathering. At 
the very least, enforcement would have to be done evenhandedly without 
targeting information-gatherers. 
But the rules regulating research purposefully target knowledge-acquisition. 
Stripping away some of the current regulations and ethical sensibilities about 
research would make a small difference today and a big difference tomorrow. 
Current law inhibits traditional means of experimentation even where there is 
no known or foreseeable risk from the intervention. If the law is expanded 
(which many scholars have advocated for66), it would stifle the future 
development of knowledge through automated trials and data analysis.  
The second significant clash between Empirical Liberty and modern 
regulation comes from laws that directly and purposefully restrict access to 
information. The First Amendment has long protected the right of “insiders” to 
share information with “outsiders” by applying scrutiny when the law burdens 
                                                                                                                     
 63 Bambauer, supra note 62, at 507. 
 64 See id. at 509 n.80 (explaining that “exempt” research must undergo an approval 
process to ensure that the research really is exempt); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.505.  
 65 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 66 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
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or restricts that information dissemination.67 But until recently, courts have been 
blind to the First Amendment’s application to another category of rules: those 
that restrict outsiders from attempting to access the information without the 
cooperation of insiders.68 These laws include civil and criminal trade secrets 
laws, privacy laws (including the Wiretap Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
and the intrusion upon seclusion tort), and anti-hacking laws (including the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Espionage Act).69  
Unlike trespass and battery laws, these laws are designed to obstruct 
information-gathering. Like bans on mechanical recording (described above),70 
they could be challenged not only for interfering with Empirical Liberty but also 
for restricting the production of future speech and, thus, interfering with Claim 
Liberty.71 However, most of these examples differ from laws restricting 
research in one major respect: they are more closely drawn to concrete and 
important state interests. Trade secrets can help foster innovation similarly to 
patents.72 Anti-hacking laws prevent espionage, denial-of-service attacks, and 
downstream identity theft.73 Wiretapping laws and legal duties of 
confidentiality can provide a healthy and necessary respite from the pressure of 
social judgment.74 Many of the laws designed to manage information flows have 
a sufficiently compelling explanation at their center that they should withstand 
facial challenges and avoid wholesale razing.  
Nevertheless, First Amendment interests in Empirical Liberty should give 
litigants an opportunity to challenge the contours of information-gathering 
prohibitions when they are applied to harmless empirical inquiry. For example, 
the CFAA has been interpreted by several federal courts to apply serious civil 
and criminal penalties to anybody who accesses a website for a purpose that 
violates the website’s terms of service, even when the website is available to the 
public without password protection.75 The criminal provisions are not limited to 
                                                                                                                     
 67 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. 
v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012). 
 68 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1199 (D. Idaho 2015). 
 69 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 61 (2014) (“A large and 
growing body of wiretap statutes and information security laws rely heavily on the 
distinction [between information and information gathering].”). 
 70 See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 71 Id. at 63. Claim Liberty and Empirical Liberty are closely related since the process 
of testing a hypothesis is useful both for validating or invalidating an existing claim and for 
later offering a claim with stronger evidence. They are both cogs in the machine of scientific 
progress. I have argued that the First Amendment should protect information-collection as a 
necessary part of knowledge creation and, thus, of the freedom of thought. Id. at 61. 
 72 They may even foster a different style of collaboration and invention than the patent 
system can. See Derek E. Bambauer, Secrecy Is Dead—Long Live Trade Secrets, 93 DENV. 
L. REV. 833, 833–37 (2016). 
 73 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 74 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012).  
 75 CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 597 Fed. App’x 116, 129–30 (3d Cir. 
2015); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2003); United States 
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instances of unauthorized access that cause risk of harm.76 And both the criminal 
and civil provisions of the CFAA expose violators to much more liability than 
an ordinary contract claim would.77 In theory, a website’s terms of service could 
restrict access to users who prefer dogs to cats, and unsuspecting cat-lovers 
would become criminally liable by continuing to engage the website. Of course, 
websites do not have these sorts of wacky terms, but they do have terms that 
forbid scraping information and the use of fake identities to make online 
accounts.78 The CFAA, therefore, dangles significant risk of punishment over 
researchers who would like to test online services for evidence of racial bias or 
who would like to scrape publicly displayed information in order to put it in a 
more usable form for sociological research.  
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is currently representing a 
group of researchers to challenge the CFAA on First Amendment grounds.79 
Some aspects of the case, such as examples where a website’s terms of service 
would prohibit the future publication of any remarks that disparage the 
company, seem very likely to persuade a court to set limits on the scope of the 
CFAA when it borrows terms of service for its activation. Other aspects, such 
as the researchers’ interests in scraping publicly available information, may rely 
on the accumulating cases that recognize a First Amendment right to record in 
public.80  
However, a third set of examples in the ACLU’s case are much more 
difficult using current precedent: the ACLU argues that researchers should be 
able to not only access information on a public website without risk of criminal 
liability but also engage in deceit in order to study the company that runs the 
website or the other users of its services.81 For example, one set of plaintiffs 
wishes to be able to test websites that manage housing and apartment listings to 
see whether minority users of the website are steered to different options than 
white users are.82 This would involve creating profiles with false information in 
violation of the website’s terms of service.83 Pretexting that is done for the 
                                                                                                                     
v. Lowson, No. 10-114 (KSH), 2010 WL 9552416, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010) (prosecuting 
for violating website terms of service); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 456–57, 461, 
467 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (finding a violation of terms of service is sufficient but also finding 
that the criminal sanctions for violating terms of service alone was unconstitutionally vague). 
 76 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a). 
 77 The CFAA allows civil claimants to seek compensatory damages, and defendants are 
also at risk of criminal prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c), (g). 
 78 See Complaint at 19, Sandvig v. Lynch, No. 1:16-cv-01368 (D.D.C. June 29, 2016), 
https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/sandvig-v-lynch-complaint 
[https://perma.cc/3E7J-UPAG] (“[T]en commonly-visited employment websites . . . all 
prohibit scraping and providing false information.”). 
 79 Id. at 4. 
 80 See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 81 Complaint, supra note 78, at 34, 37. 
 82 Id. at 24. 
 83 See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Christina Fong, An Experiment in Hiring 
Discrimination Via Online Social Networks (July 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript at 3), 
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purpose of impersonating another person to receive a benefit that should go to 
them, or to engage in some other form of fraud, may be the sort of conduct that 
is appropriate for the CFAA’s application. It is, after all, analogous to providing 
another person’s credentials to access a nonpublic server. But pretexting for 
research purposes does not pose the sort of societal risks that should be allowed 
to trump Empirical Liberty. If the research risks harming the reputation of the 
service (by, e.g., generating evidence of racial bias), those risks to the company 
are mirror opposites to the benefits for the public.84 At times, courts have 
recognized that the public benefits from deceit by testers,85 but the benefit has 
never been blended into First Amendment doctrine. Empirical Liberty provides 
a conceptual basis to do so. 
One last observation about where a modest commitment to Empirical 
Liberty could lead us: so far, the examples I have covered involve a negative 
constitutional right—a right to be free from punishment if we are engaging in 
information-gathering or low-risk experimentation. Empirical Liberty could 
provide the basis for a positive right to access information too, particularly with 
respect to information maintained by the government. Today, access to public 
records is a matter of largess.86 Federal and state laws set the terms of access, 
and they exempt a good deal of information from disclosure.87 If a well-
functioning marketplace of ideas depends on the people’s ability to test the 
claims and charges against empirical evidence, it may offend free speech ideals 
when the government hordes that probative evidence. A positive right to access 
information can become absurd very quickly, so I do not mean to suggest that 
the First Amendment would require the government to engage in experiments 
or information-collection that it would not otherwise do. But where information 
already exists within public coffers, any denial of access should be justified on 
the same terms as the prohibitions on information-collection discussed above. 
This Part has explored some of the implications of a limited right to 
Empirical Liberty. The result would be another expansion of First Amendment 
coverage, a prospect that will worry many progressive defenders of the modern 
regulatory state who already see free speech law as a threat.88 But as the next 
Part will show, Empirical Liberty has the potential to indirectly help regulators, 
too. 
                                                                                                                     
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2031979 [https://perma.cc/RM5A-MZFJ] (using fake Facebook 
profiles to test whether employers used social media to make hiring decisions). 
 84 As for risks to individual users of the website who may interact with a researcher, 
those users will be harmed only if the researcher’s online behavior is unusually invasive or 
anxiety-producing. Such behavior may trigger legal liability of some other sort (intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, or violation of the privacy torts, for example), but they are 
additional to and independent from the researcher’s access to the online service or forum. 
 85 See Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351–52 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 86 See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1212 (2002). 
 87 See id. at 1161–62. 
 88 See Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 165, 179 (2015). 
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IV. THE PAYOFF FOR THE MODERN REGULATORY STATE 
Expansions to First Amendment coverage are always going to interfere with 
regulators in the most direct sense. But, over time, constitutional protection for 
Empirical Liberty can embolden the regulatory state and help insulate it from 
collateral attack by greatly increasing the quantity and quality of information.  
The state stands to benefit from the fruits of Empirical Liberty in two ways. 
First, empirical studies and data can help improve the state’s selection of 
political priorities and the efficacy of its political solutions. Federal, state, and 
local governments are all making efforts to move away from regulation by 
anecdote and toward an evidence-based approach to lawmaking.89 This year, 
Congress passed the Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016 
that established a commission to help guide and transition the federal 
government to an approach that harnesses the insights from data and empirical 
research.90 Unfortunately, the commission itself has put excessive emphasis on 
privacy, discrimination, and other issues that have historically led to the 
restriction, rather than the promotion, of research in order to curb small or 
hypothetical risks.91 But the very existence of the commission suggests that the 
federal government has a genuine desire to increase knowledge through 
empirical studies. 
Second, the rapid increase in empirical evidence that is likely to blossom 
now that data is big, experimentation is automated, and machines can learn can 
help the state resist First Amendment challenges, counterintuitive as that seems. 
What courts demand from the government, when scrutiny is applied to a law, is 
evidence.92 Oliver Wendell Holmes’ legacy on First Amendment doctrine is a 
solemn commitment from the judiciary to approach a state’s claim that speech 
is harmful with great skepticism.93 Although the Court has left open the 
possibility of common sense providing sufficient proof of the necessity and 
efficacy of a speech restriction, in practice it has demanded empirical 
evidence.94 This puts tremendous pressure on the legislature to have such 
evidence and on the courts to competently assess it. 
                                                                                                                     
 89 G. WILLIAM HOAGLAND ET AL., BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, CONGRESS AND 
EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING: CREATING A 21ST CENTURY LEGISLATURE 6 (May 2017), 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/congress-and-evidence-based-policymaking/  
[https://perma.cc/LA9A-GE8G]. 
 90 Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-140, 130 
Stat. 317. 
 91 Nat’l Acads. of Scis., Eng’g, & Med., Second Meeting of the Commission on 
Evidence-Based Policymaking, LIVESTREAM (Sept. 9, 2016), https://livestream.com/ 
accounts/7036396/events/6265619/videos/137020942 [https://perma.cc/K5T6-LUQU]. 
 92 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 93 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(requiring a “clear and imminent danger”).  
 94 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–804 (2011); City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 312 (2000); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
789 (1978) (“But there has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been 
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Empirical Liberty can help both fronts. First, even when the state has the 
desire to construct legal restrictions on information in a way that addresses 
realistic risks without imposing unnecessary burdens on speech, it is forced to 
do so with a paucity of reliable data.95 Disinterested researchers who attempt to 
collect data about the usage and effect of online information services are stymied 
more often by legal impediments than technical ones.96 Empirical liberty could 
help regulators understand which types of speech cause concrete, verifiable 
harm. An abundance of data introduces new problems—namely, differentiating 
good from bad studies when all sides come with some empirical support.97 But 
those problems are mitigated with increased competence among judges,98 not 
by keeping the number of studies or the quality of available data low.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical Liberty is the neglected sibling of Claim Liberty that gives all 
Americans the opportunity not only to receive competing messages, but to 
assess their worth. Courts cannot give the robust constitutional protection to 
Empirical Liberty that they currently apply to Claim Liberty. Unbridled 
experimentation and information-gathering would run roughshod over the rights 
and interests of other people. But courts can, and should, recognize a 
constitutional interest when empirical inquiry poses little to no risk. In some 
limited cases, they already do.  
  
                                                                                                                     
overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts . . . .”); N.Y. 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam).  
 95 See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.  
 96 See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.  
 97 Edward E. Leamer, Let’s Take the Con out of Econometrics 1 (UCLA Discussion 
Paper No. 239, 1982), http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp239.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/GT5S-J9SM]. 
 98 The judiciary is sometimes criticized for having less competence than the 
democratically accountable branches of the government at assessing the quality of empirical 
evidence. Justice Breyer is the Court’s biggest critic in this regard, admonishing that the 
Court should give deference to the legislature on technical matters since the Court lacks 
proficiency. Brown, 564 U.S. at 855 (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, when the Court 
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